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ABSTRACT
 Peer recognition systems are an increasingly popular management control tool 
through which employees can recognize and thank other employees. While these systems 
have potential to motivate firm desired behaviors, including behaviors that are 
unobservable by management, little is known about if, or when, they are effective. Using 
a laboratory experiment, I examine the effectiveness of these systems in motivating 
employee helping behavior, both when the system includes rewards and when it does not. 
While I document that helping behavior is generally greater when peer recognition 
systems are present, I also document that group affiliation is a key moderating factor in 
determining the effectiveness of these systems. Specifically, I find that peer recognition 
systems are more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group helping. Conversely, 
I also find that the incremental benefit of adding rewards to a peer recognition system is 
greater for out-group versus in-group helping. Theoretical and practical implications for 
peer recognition system design are discussed.
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This study provides an initial examination of the motivational effects of peer 
recognition systems as well as insight into when providing reward incentives in 
conjunction with those systems is likely to be most beneficial. Many firms including 
Intuit, Intel, Zappos, and Google have implemented peer recognition systems that allow 
employees to recognize other employees in the firm for their help and accomplishments 
(Irvine, 2012; Jones, 2015; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). Despite their growing 
popularity in practice and in the business press (e.g., Globoforce, 2008; Gorman, 2014; 
Irvine, 2012; Jones, 2015), there is little research addressing peer recognition systems and 
how they work. Using a laboratory experiment, I examine how the presence, and type, of 
peer recognition system effects employees’ beliefs, team identities, and most importantly 
actions.  
Peer recognition is recognition of one’s individual contribution sent directly from 
one employee to another employee (at the same or similar organizational level), at the 
sending employee’s discretion. Peer recognition systems are a type of control system that 
encourage employees to acknowledge peers for positive individual behaviors. Given their 
responsibility for the design of the incentive and control system (Bonner & Sprinkle, 
2002), management accountants can benefit from greater insight into the effectiveness of 
peer recognition systems.  
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While firms likely wish to capture multiple benefits from implementing peer 
recognition systems (e.g., helping behavior, better individual performance, employee 
satisfaction, reduced turnover, etc.), in this study I focus on how these systems affect 
helping behavior. Often firm outcomes are dependent on various individuals or 
departments supporting one another’s efforts to achieve their individual objectives, yet 
such helping behavior can be difficult to motivate using traditional incentives because it 
is difficult for management to observe (Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 
1999; Sprinkle, 2003). Because peer employees can often observe what management 
cannot, peer recognition systems may provide a unique opportunity to motivate helping 
behavior.  
A choice firms face when considering the implementation of a peer recognition 
system is whether or not to sponsor rewards to be given along with the peer recognition. 
While one might assume that adding rewards would provide additional motivation, prior 
research on incentives and social preferences (e.g., Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; 
Lourenço, 2015) suggests that the likely effect may be more nuanced. Further, although 
including rewards is a common feature of a number of peer recognition programs in 
practice (Irvine, 2012; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012), research has yet to establish 
if, or when, the inclusion of rewards provides incremental motivation. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide insight into (1) whether peer recognition systems are effective in 
motivating employees to help others in the firm, (2) when peer recognition systems 
(absent rewards) might be more or less effective, and (3) when there is an incremental 
benefit of tying rewards to peer recognition. 
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Given the peer nature of peer recognition, employees’ social ties or group 
affiliations are likely to have important implications for how effective these systems are 
in motivating helping behavior. Further, in many settings, the firm can benefit when 
employees help both within their own groups and across groups (e.g., teams, 
departments, business units, etc.). It is possible, however, that interventions which will 
motivate employees to help a member of their own group (i.e., in-group) might not 
motivate them to help a member of another group (i.e., out-group), and vice versa. As 
such, different design features of a peer recognition system may be more or less effective 
depending upon the group affiliation of employees. 
I predict that the presence of a peer recognition system will generally motivate 
increased helping behavior. I further predict that employees’ group affiliation will 
moderate the effectiveness of peer recognition systems (absent rewards). I form this 
prediction based on findings from social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1990), which 
suggest that individuals are more willing to help others when a shared identity is salient 
to them (De Cremer & Van Vugt 1998; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). I expect the presence 
of a peer recognition system to create a setting that makes salient the team identity shared 
by in-group (but not out-group) members, leading these systems to be more effective in 
motivating in-group versus out-group helping behavior.  
Conversely, I also predict that there will be a greater benefit from tying rewards to 
peer recognition in settings where helping is more out-group than in-group. This is 
because, while prior research suggests that incentives typically strengthen motivation, it 
also suggests that incentives can crowd out or substitute for, rather than add to the 
motivational effects derived from other types of motivators (e.g., intrinsic or social) 
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(Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Lourenço, 2015). Because I expect 
the degree of social motivation to be lesser for the out-group versus the in-group, I also 
expect substitution effects will be less relevant for the out-group versus the in-group. As 
a result, I expect that adding rewards to peer recognition systems will be more beneficial 
for out-group versus in-group helping. 
I use a laboratory experiment to test my predictions. Participants are paid a fixed 
wage for working on a data entry task for six minutes and are then allowed to choose how 
much of an additional four minutes they wish to spend working on the task to help 
another participant versus working for their own gain. Time spent working for 
themselves earns them an additional piece-rate per entry they complete. Participants also 
know that time spent working to help someone else earns that participant additional pay. 
This creates a setting where participants must make a costly sacrifice of time (which 
represents forgone earnings) in order to help another participant. I manipulate group 
affiliation as either “in-group” or “out-group,” by assigning participants to color groups 
when they enter the laboratory and then creating a helping opportunity either for a 
participant from their own color group (in-group) or for a participant from a different 
color group (out-group). I manipulate the peer recognition system as either absent, 
present, or present with a reward. In the peer recognition with rewards condition, 
participants know that if they are recognized, in addition to receiving the recognition 
message, they will have the opportunity to choose a small reward at the end of the 
experiment.  
My experimental findings are consistent with my predictions. When comparing 
the presence versus absence of a peer recognition system (i.e., without regard for other 
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moderating variables), I find that peer recognition systems generally lead to an increase 
in the amount of time participants spend helping others, and that participants’ 
expectations of receiving help mediates this effect. Further, when I split by condition, I 
find an interaction between group affiliation and the presence versus absence of a peer 
recognition system suggesting that when no rewards are present, peer recognition systems 
are more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group helping behavior. Conversely, 
I also find an interaction between group affiliation and the presence versus absence of 
rewards within the peer recognition system, suggesting that adding rewards is more 
motivating among out-group versus in-group members.  
The Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) defines the role of management 
accountants to include, “devising…performance management systems, and providing 
expertise in … control to formulate and implement an organization’s strategy” (IMA, 
2019). Peer recognition systems are a unique type of control, which are likely to motivate 
greater helping behavior both directly and indirectly via their impact on company culture 
(Jones, 2015; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Peer recognition systems bear 
similarities to mutual monitoring systems, only in peer recognition systems employees 
are asked to acknowledge peers for their positive individual behaviors as opposed to 
report peers’ negative behaviors to management. My study provides an initial 
examination of the motivational effects of peer recognition systems and the addition of 
rewards to them. As such, my findings will be of interest to management accountants 
who have responsibility over compensation, incentive, and control system design.  
My study also extends an emerging body of literature on recognition (e.g., Bradler 
et al., 2014; Burke, 2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017), and introduces peer 
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recognition as an important source through which recognition may come. I document that 
peer recognition systems are effective in motivating helping behavior, which prior work 
has suggested can be difficult to accomplish using traditional incentives due to the 
difficulty of observing such behaviors (Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 
1999; Sprinkle, 2003). Further, I document that group affiliation influences the 
effectiveness of peer recognition systems both when rewards are included and when they 
are not.  
While firms will also want to consider costs associated with implementing peer 
recognition systems, my study provides insights into the potential benefits. My results 
suggest that firms wishing to motivate greater helping behavior when group affiliation is 
uncertain or unstable (e.g., across departments or workgroups) would likely do well to tie 
rewards to peer recognition systems. Alternatively, my results suggest that if a firm is 
able to strengthen the degree to which employees view themselves as being a part of the 
same group (e.g., via social events, team building activities, etc.) then they may be able to 
benefit significantly from a peer recognition system without incurring any additional 
costs of providing rewards.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background and setting: peer recognition systems 
As part of an effort to find more innovative ways to motivate employees, many 
companies have implemented formal recognition programs, a number of which include 
peer recognition as a key component (Globoforce, 2008; Gorman, 2014; Irvine, 2012; 
Jones, 2015; Nohria et al., 2008; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). While employees 
usually have opportunities to informally recognize one another (e.g., simply say, “thank 
you” or “great job” outside of any formal system), the fact that firms are also 
implementing formal peer recognition systems suggests that they are dissatisfied with the 
extent to which such informal recognition is happening, or perhaps are hoping to garner 
more of the motivational potential of peer recognition.1 Emerging companies are also 
specializing in helping firms recognize and reward employees, including developing 
customized online platforms for that purpose (e.g., Globoforce and Motivosity).  
Many peer recognition programs also allow employees to send company 
sponsored rewards of modest value in conjunction with recognition (Irvine, 2012; Quinn, 
2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). Often these rewards can be sent with minimal management 
                                                          
1 For example, relative to informal peer recognition, formal peer recognition systems 
could lead to more peer recognition, make the peer recognition more impactful, or both. 
While I do not study informal peer recognition, I acknowledge that the effects of formal 
systems that I document could be moderated depending on how effective the informal 
recognition culture of a company already is. I discuss this more in section V.   
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oversight (e.g., the manager may receive a carbon copy of the recognition message, but 
require no direct approval). A common way rewards are administered is through dollars 
or points that then must be redeemed for gift cards or other tangible rewards (Globoforce, 
2008; Motivosity, 2019; Zappos Insights, 2012). For example, at Intuit, employees can 
use an online recognition platform to write a recognition message and select from a range 
of cash values (e.g. $0, $10, $25, or $50) to send to another employee.2 The receiving 
employee can then use the same system to redeem the rewards for gift cards of their 
choice (Globoforce, 2008). Total monetary values of peer rewards relative to employee 
salaries are usually comparatively small. Thus, rewards associated with peer recognition 
typically provide “fun money” as opposed to significantly increasing employees’ income 
(Kelly et al., 2017; Presslee et al., 2013; Quinn, 2018).3 Using relatively small rewards 
may further act as a control; reducing the incentive for employees to collude to mutually 
reward one another so as to inflate each other’s income (e.g., Evans et al., 2016). 
An important aspect of peer recognition systems is their potential to motivate 
helping across departments and skillsets (e.g., Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). 
Often firm outcomes are dependent on various individuals or departments supporting one 
another’s efforts to achieve their individual objectives. For example, other departments 
often rely on employees from the IT department to help them with their technical needs. 
While helping other departments would likely be part of an IT employee’s job 
                                                          
2 Although in practice, employees can sometimes choose from a range of possible reward 
amounts, in the present study I only address the presence versus absence of rewards 
associated with peer recognition and not variation in the value of the reward.  
3 Prior research has considered the effects of providing tangible versus cash rewards on 
employee motivation (Kelly et al., 2017; Presslee et al., 2013). In this study, I hold 
reward type constant, as a tangible reward, and vary whether a reward is present or not in 
conjunction with peer recognition.  
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description, it may be difficult for the IT manager to directly reward an employee for 
timely, quality service to other departments due to the difficulty of observing every 
individual interaction of that employee. As another example, an individual may have 
knowledge or skills that, if shared, might improve the outcome of a team member’s 
assignment on a group project. In such cases, a peer recognition system gives employees 
the ability to directly recognize and reward others who may help them, leading to better 
results for those receiving help and for the company as a whole.  
Peer recognition is different from peer evaluation. Under peer evaluation, peers 
provide positive or negative feedback about another employee to the manager. Peer 
recognition on the other hand is exclusively positive in nature and is often sent directly to 
the recipient, although managers are frequently made aware of the recognition as well.4 A 
growing body of research has also begun to consider the effects of recognition from a 
manager on employees’ motivation to complete their work (Bradler et al., 2014; Burke, 
2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017). Whereas recognition from a manager is vertical in 
nature, peer recognition is typically horizontal in nature. Research on manager provided 
recognition has also considered the effect of making relative performance recognition or 
information publicly available to an employee’s co-workers versus privately conveyed to 
a particular employee (Burke, 2019; Tafkov, 2013; Wang, 2017). In practice, peer 
                                                          
4 In practice, variation exists both in how salient peer recognition is to management and 
in how salient it is to employees that management may be aware of their recognition. In 
the present study, I develop theory regarding the effect of a peer recognition system in a 
setting where management does not play a role. I make this choice to cleanly test the 
effect of the peer recognition system without the potential confounding effect of 
management’s awareness of the peer recognition. While it is possible that the presence of 
a manager could moderate (or potentially enhance) certain aspects of my findings, 
generally I would expect that my theory should extend to settings where managers are 
also aware of the peer recognition.       
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provided recognition may also be public or private in nature. In this study, I focus on 
private peer recognition. Any potential influence of using public peer recognition rather 
than private peer recognition is beyond the scope of this study.   
My study speaks to settings in which a peer recognition system supports 
employees directly recognizing peers: both those seen as being part of one’s own group 
and those viewed as part of a different group.5 In such settings, employees can recognize 
co-workers for their help and other accomplishments. Helping is usually costly to the 
helper however, as they might have otherwise used the time they spend helping to engage 
in some other activity, such as leisure, or working more for themselves (which may 
increase their own pay, bonus eligibility, future promotion potential, etc.). I also assume a 
setting in which the potential recipient of help needs/benefits from help (even though it 
may not be directly solicited6) and the firm always benefits when help is given. Although 
in practice, there is likely a firm specific “optimal balance” of helping others versus 
completing one’s own work, the fact that many firms are implementing peer recognition 
systems suggest that these firms believe that more help would benefit them, and thus I 
make a simplifying assumption that more help is better.  
                                                          
5 Many different types of “groups” exist in practice. For example, employees from 
different departments, teams, and training backgrounds might all perceive themselves as 
being from different groups. Importantly, my theory is intended to generalize to any 
setting in which there exists a salient in-group or out-group connection/distinction 
between the employee who could give help and the employee who could receive help.  
6 In practice, there are many opportunities for helping even when it may not be directly 
solicited. For example, employees may simply see a need they might fill, share useful 
information others do not know they have, or prioritize their own work in order to help 
others meet deadlines without being asked. 
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Hypothesis development 
 Standard economic theory predicts that absent current or future monetary 
incentives, individuals will withhold costly effort, including effort to help others 
(Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert, 2001; Prendergast, 1999). Behavioral 
studies, however, have found that individuals are sometimes willing to help others, even 
when it is costly (e.g., Black et al., 2019; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Newman et al., 2019). 
Therefore, I assume as a baseline that, given an opportunity to help, some individuals will 
do so even when current or future monetary incentives for doing so are absent. I now 
outline theory predicting how peer recognition systems affect employees’ willingness to 
exert costly effort to help others. I begin by discussing how a peer recognition system 
may generally (i.e., without considering the group affiliation of employees or whether or 
not rewards are tied to the recognition) affect beliefs about the likelihood of receiving 
help and how this in turn influences willingness to give help.  
 I expect that, in many cases, the implementation of a formal peer recognition 
system will signal to employees that the firm desires and supports helping behavior. 
Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) find that controls directly influence people’s sense of what 
behaviors are appropriate in a given situation, and consistent with this finding, I expect 
peer recognition systems to signal to employees that the firm wants them to help others. 
While this direct signaling may have some impact, I expect a greater effect to come as the 
result of how the peer recognition system updates employee beliefs about the likelihood 
of receiving help. Specifically, I consider how an individual’s anticipatory beliefs about 
how they are likely to be treated in a particular situation, influences their current behavior 
toward another who is not necessarily the same person who could help or hurt them.  
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Direct reciprocity (i.e., the opportunity to directly reward or punish an individual 
who helps or harms oneself) has been studied extensively and shown to have significant 
effects on behavior, including enhancing individuals’ willingness to cooperate with 
others (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; 
2000b; 2002). In this paper, however, I focus on the less studied role of indirect 
reciprocity (i.e., reciprocity involving a third party) (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). More 
specifically, how one’s expectations regarding whether someone is likely to help them 
influences his/her own helping behavior toward a different individual. In so doing, I study 
how peer recognition systems influence the perceived norms or “culture” of the firm 
(Graham et al., 2019).7 Employee expectations regarding others’ helping behavior are 
likely to influence their own helping behavior for at least two reasons. First, psychology 
research suggests that people have strong preferences for behaving similarly to those 
around them (Asch & Guetzkow, 1951; Cialdini et al., 1990; Sherif, 1936). Peer 
recognition systems are likely to create a belief that others will engage in helping 
behavior, and this belief is then likely to influence employees’ own helping behavior. 
Second, as beliefs about general helping behavior go up, a natural implication is that the 
individual themselves is more likely to be helped by others. If individuals believe that 
they specifically are likely to be helped by someone else, then preferences for fairness 
suggest that they will feel an obligation to also help others (i.e., if someone is likely to 
help me, I should help someone else) (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Sugden, 1984).   
                                                          
7 Note that I consider how peer recognition systems affect expectations regarding others’ 
(simultaneous) helping behavior in a single period setting. Thus, while what I study is 
similar to a “norm,” I am cautious in using this term because no actual behavioral 
consensus has developed.  
13 
To summarize, I predict that a peer recognition system will influence employees’ 
beliefs about the likelihood of receiving help. As employees’ expectations of receiving 
help go up, they will in turn feel a greater obligation to help others. Hypothesis 1a and 
Hypothesis 1b are stated in alternate form as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Employee helping behavior will be greater when a peer recognition 
system is present than when it is absent.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Employee expectations of receiving help will mediate the relation 
between peer recognition systems and employee helping behavior.  
 
To this point, I have discussed the effect of the presence versus absence of a peer 
recognition system on employee expectations and helping choices generally. I now take a 
more nuanced view and consider how peer recognition systems may differentially affect 
in-group versus out-group helping. I begin by discussing my predicted effects when the 
peer recognition system does not include rewards.   
Group affiliations are likely to have meaningful implications for helping behavior 
in organizations. Organizations are often complex with multiple departments, divisions, 
work teams, and other forms of “groups.” Such groups, though often necessary, may at 
times present challenges in achieving the goals of the overall organization (Ashforth & 
Meal, 1989; Brewer, 1979; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Stone, 2004; Towry, 2003). 
For example, members of various departments (e.g., accounting, marketing, engineering, 
etc.) may opt to help members of their own department, while being more reluctant to 
help members of other departments.  
Social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 
1985) suggests that individuals self-categorize into groups and that their identification 
with those groups affects the way they interact with others, both those from their own 
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group (i.e., in-group), and those from other groups (i.e., out-groups). As individuals 
identify with a group, there is a tendency to show in-group bias: favoring in-group 
members, while possibly discriminating against out-group members (Brewer, 1979). A 
number of studies find that individuals cooperate more in social dilemma settings when a 
common group identity is salient to them (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1998; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984; Wit & Wilke, 1992). For example, De Cremer and Van Vugt (1998) find 
that when a collective identity as opposed to a personal identity is made salient, 
participants contributed more in a public goods game. Balliet et al. (2014) also find in a 
meta-analysis that people are more cooperative with in-group versus out-group members. 
In addition, research has found that group membership can influence auditor judgments 
to be more likely to conform to perceived group norms (King, 2002). Together this 
discussion suggests that the degree to which employees identify with others will likely 
influence their willingness to help them. 
The prior paragraph discussed findings suggesting that not only group 
membership, but the salience or degree of identification with the group is predictive of 
willingness to help. In forming a prediction regarding the effect of peer recognition 
systems when employees share an in-group versus an out-group status, it is important to 
highlight the potential for peer recognition systems to strengthen the sense of team 
identity in-group members feel to one another, beyond any connection they may already 
feel due to being part of the same group. Research suggests that social identities can be 
made more or less salient depending on the setting and context (Hogg & Terry, 2000; 
Oakes & Turner, 1990). When employees are already part of a group, I predict peer 
recognition systems are likely to create a context that strengthens the connection in-group 
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members feel to one another. The reason is that by encouraging peer recognition, these 
systems implicitly suggest a group paradigm (i.e., that everyone should support each 
other and is on the same team). This is likely to emphasize the team identity of group 
members. As a result, I expect employees to feel a greater obligation to help those in their 
group. Alternatively, out-group members do not share a pre-existing in-group status, and 
as such, there is less of a team identity to emphasize. As a result, I expect peer 
recognition systems to do less to motivate out-group helping.8 
To summarize, I predict that the presence of a peer recognition system (which 
does not include rewards) will motivate in-group helping to a greater degree than out-
group helping. Hypothesis 2 is formally stated in alternate form as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: The increase in employee helping behavior caused by a peer recognition 
system (absent rewards) will be greater when helping is in-group as opposed to 
out-group.  
 
 I now turn my focus to the effect of adding rewards to a peer recognition system. 
Research has found that monetary rewards (whether cash-based or tangible rewards with 
monetary value) can motivate effort (Banker et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 2017; Lazear, 
2000; Presslee et al., 2013; Shearer, 2004). However, research has also found that 
monetary incentives and other types of motivation (e.g., intrinsic or social) are not always 
additive in nature, but rather often are substitutes (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009; Bénabou & 
                                                          
8 Note that in the setting I consider, employees do not necessarily know who might be 
able to help them (i.e., whether they are in-group or out-group). Employees only know 
the group affiliation of those they could help. As such, while I use general expectations 
of receiving help in developing my predictions for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, these 
expectations should not theoretically differ based on employees’ knowledge of the group 
affiliation of an individual they might help. Consequently, I do not use expectations of 
receiving help, but rather feelings of team identity in developing predictions for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
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Tirole, 2006; Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Deci, 1971; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Lourenço, 
2015). For example, using a field experiment, Lourenço (2015) found a negative 
interaction between monetary incentives and public recognition from management. Her 
study suggests that these two act as substitutes that crowd out the motivational effects of 
the other.  
Consistent with this literature, I also expect that reward incentives and social 
motivation9 will not be simply additive, but rather will act as substitutes. Importantly, I 
expect that the degree to which this substitution effect will manifest depends on the group 
affiliation of employees. If team identity is relatively weak (as I expect for out-group 
members), then adding a reward should have a positive effect on overall motivation. If 
team identity is relatively strong however (as I expect for in-group members), then it is 
less clear what effect adding a reward will have on overall motivation because the reward 
could substitute for (or crowd out) the social motivation derived from the sense of team 
identity.10 As a result, I predict that adding rewards will be more beneficial for out-group 
helping than in-group helping. Hypothesis 3 is formally stated in alternate form as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be more beneficial for 
out-group helping than in-group helping.
                                                          
9 I use the term “social motivation” here and elsewhere in the paper, to refer to 
motivation that is derived from the social environment and is not caused by a reward. The 
specific source of “social motivation” in my study is the team identity employees feel.   
10 Note that my predicted substitution effect could result in in-group helping decreasing, 
not changing (i.e., perfect substitutes), or increasing but to a lesser extent than if no 
substitution were present. As such, I do not predict an absolute level difference for in-
group helping, but rather that adding rewards will be more beneficial for out-group than 




Experimental design and task 
I use a 2x2+2 nested design to test my hypotheses. I manipulate group affiliation 
as either in-group or out-group, peer recognition system as either present or absent, and 
within the peer recognition present condition also manipulate the presence of rewards 
(leading to three total conditions related to peer recognition: no peer recognition, peer 
recognition, and peer recognition with rewards). Experimental sessions are randomly 
assigned to one of the three peer recognition conditions prior to running the experiment. 
Group affiliation is manipulated within each session as described below. I run 12 sessions 
with 16 participants each, resulting in 192 participants in total.11 I programmed the 
experiment using Qualtrics, combined with Microsoft Power Automate to facilitate 
personal interaction.  
 Participants complete a data entry task in which they have an abbreviated 
customer listing and must identify and input the six-digit number of an indicated 
customer. Participants input the customer number and then move to the next entry. More 
entries can be accessed by scrolling down the page. All participants receive the same 
entries, in the same order. See the appendix for an excerpt from the experimental 
instructions explaining the task.   
                                                          
11 I obtained approval to run this study from my University’s Institutional Review Board. 
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 Participants first complete the task for six minutes (360 seconds) and are paid 
$5.00 for their time. Participants then choose how much of an additional four minutes 
(240 seconds) they will spend working for themselves versus working to help another 
participant.12 The four minutes are allocated in one-minute (60 second) increments to 
these two options. During the additional time participants spend working for themselves 
they earn $0.05 for each correct entry they complete. Participants also know that during 
the additional time they spend working to help another participant, that participant will 
benefit from each entry they complete, however participants do not know precisely by 
how much.13 Participants receive no direct financial benefit from helping. Thus, 
allocating time to help is costly in that it requires participants to forgo additional pay they 
could have earned if they had allocated the time to working more for themselves.14      
  Everyone knows that potential helpers will be kept anonymous unless help is 
given. That is, if a participant chooses to help, then the participant receiving help is 
subsequently told who helped them and how much they were helped. Alternatively, if no 
                                                          
12 For simplicity, in my setting participants do not request help, rather in the instructions, 
I make it clear to all participants that the other participant will benefit from any help 
given.  
13 Participants earn $0.10 for each entry someone else completes to help them. However, 
I refrain from telling participants the exact benefit from their help to reduce the likelihood 
that participants focus on economic payouts when making their helping choices. This 
design choice reflects many settings in practice, where employees do not know precisely 
how much someone else might benefit from their help. 
14 I am primarily interested in how peer recognition systems affect employees’ 
willingness to make costly sacrifices to help others. While in practice there are likely a 
variety of alternative activities employees might engage in instead of helping (e.g., slack 
time, additional time on their own work, etc.), these alternatives are of less interest to me. 
I therefore assume a setting where the firm will always benefit from greater helping, and 
impose a financial cost to helping to proxy for a number of appealing alternatives that 
employees may experience in practice. 
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help is given, then the potential helper is never identified.15 All participants also know 
that there is the possibility that someone else in the room could help them, but that they 
will only know who after the task is over and if that person chose to help them. If no help 
was given, then participants are told they received no help and nothing else after the task 
is over. Participants know that the person they have the opportunity to help is not the 
same person who could help them. I make this clear to rule out typical direct reciprocity 
concerns and to ensure that my manipulation is indeed influencing expectations of help 
generally.       
Experimental overview 
Upon arrival, participants are greeted and handed a card with their seat 
assignment. The card is color-coded and corresponds to their color division as discussed 
later on. After participants find their seats, each color group takes a turn standing and 
introducing themselves to the other participants in the room. Specifically, every 
individual in each group would say, “Hello, I’m participant [#] from the [color] group.” 
Participants are then read instructions while they follow along on computer monitors. 
Instructions explain the data entry task and contain the peer recognition system 
manipulation as described later. Participants must then correctly answer each question of 
a comprehension quiz.  
Next, participants complete the data entry task. Upon completion of the data entry 
task, participants complete process measures before being informed if (and if so how 
                                                          
15 I make this design choice because in practice, if a potential helper does not wish to 
engage in helping behaviors, they are often able to credibly deny their ability or capacity 
to do so. Making participants anonymous unless help is given proxies for this credible 
deniability (i.e., everyone knows someone else could help them, but they do not know 
who).  
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much) they were helped during the data entry task. Participants then make a recognition 
choice if they are in one of the peer recognition conditions and received help. All 
participants then complete additional post experimental questions and recognized 
individuals receive an onscreen recognition message (and choose a reward, if applicable). 
Finally, participants are informed of their final payment. Actual payments come in the 
form of an Amazon e-gift card. Sessions took about 30 minutes to complete. I summarize 
the experimental flow in Figure 3.1. 
Manipulations 
Group affiliation 
I manipulate group affiliation using color groups (Towry, 2003). Color groups 
might generalize to different divisions in a company (e.g., marketing, finance, 
accounting, etc.) or to different skillsets or training backgrounds. I use color groups to 
manipulate group affiliation to avoid introducing other contextual elements that could 
limit the generalizability of my results, thereby allowing me to speak to a variety of 
settings where in-group or out-group associations exist. The lab is divided into four color-
coded areas. Four participants make up each color group and they sit at computers in the 
same quadrant throughout the experiment. During the task, immediately before 
participants choose how much time they will allocate to helping another participant, they 
are told specifically whom they could help. In the in-group (out-group) conditions, 
participants have the opportunity to help someone from their own (a different) color 
group. Specifically, in the in-group conditions participants are told that they have the 
opportunity to help “participant [ID#], from your own, [color] group.” In the out-group 
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conditions, participants are informed that they have the opportunity to help “participant 
[ID#], from the [color] group.”16 
Peer recognition        
 Peer recognition is manipulated in the instructions after participants are informed 
that they will have the opportunity to help another participant in the room. Participants in 
peer recognition conditions read the following: 
To promote helping, there is a peer recognition system in place. Near the end of 
the experiment, individuals who feel like they were helped in a significant way 
will have the opportunity to choose to recognize the person who helped them by 
sending an electronic message of thanks to them.17,18 
 
 In the no peer recognition conditions there is no mention of an opportunity to be 
thanked by their peers. 
Peer recognition with rewards 
 Participants in the peer recognition with rewards conditions receive the same 
instructions as participants in the peer recognition conditions with the addition that they 
are also told, “if you are recognized you will be able to choose a reward from the 
following reward options.” The instructions contain pictures of the following five reward 
                                                          
16 The underlined text in these manipulation phrases is also highlighted in the group color 
of the participant they could help for emphasis.  
17 In practice, peer recognition systems are often framed to promote a positive culture, 
including helping behavior (Jones, 2015; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012), thus 
presenting the system as a means “to promote helping” is consistent with practice. 
Further, as discussed below, the results do not suggest that my findings are simply the 
outcome of a demand effect.  
18 In practice, employees are often allowed (and encouraged) to write personalized notes 
to peers they recognize. For simplicity, I hold recognition message content fixed. All 
recognition messages read as follows: “Participant [ID#] would like to thank and 
recognize you. Thank you for spending time to help me!” Participants do not know the 
exact message content unless (and until) they receive it. 
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options: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, M&M’s 
candy, and Twix candy bar. Although participants are not told the dollar value of the 
items, I purchased all of the items for less than $0.90 each.  
Dependent variable 
 My primary dependent variable is the amount of time participants chose to spend 
helping another participant. Other process and attention check variables are also 
collected.  
Participants 
 I recruited 192 undergraduate students from core accounting classes at a large 
public university to participate in my study. Average age is 19, and 49 percent of 
participants are female. Undergraduate students are appropriate to participate in this study 
given that I use an abstract task that requires no specialized knowledge or skills (Libby et 
al., 2002). Participants are given course credit in return for their participation and are paid 
variable amounts depending on their own, and other participants’ choices during the 
experiment as explained above. Average earnings were $7.56, with the minimum being 
























Figure 3.1 Experimental Flow 
 
Participants arrive and are 
assigned to a color group 
Instructions (including peer 
recognition manipulation) 
Complete data entry task for 
6 minutes 
Participants informed ID# and group of 
person they could help (either own 
group or a different group) 
Participants choose how much 
time to spend helping vs. working 
for themselves (primary DV) 
Complete data entry task for 4 
minutes (time is split according 
to participant’s choice above) 
Complete process measures 
Participants told if (and how much) 
someone helped them and make 
recognition choice (if applicable) 
Complete additional post-
experimental questions 






Preliminary tests and descriptive statistics 
 To assess whether participants paid attention to my group affiliation 
manipulation, I ask participants to recall whether the participant they had the opportunity 
to help was in their own color group or a different color group. 92.7% of participants 
correctly responded to this question according to their condition, suggesting that 
participants paid attention to this manipulation.19 Note that participants in peer 
recognition conditions are required to correctly acknowledge their understanding of the 
system in the comprehension quiz prior to completing the task, and thus I do not include 
a separate check for this manipulation. 
 Means for the time spent helping are displayed in Table 4.1, and are graphically 
displayed in Figure 4.1. As shown, the means suggest a pattern consistent with my 
hypotheses. Namely, it appears that helping is generally higher when a peer recognition 
system is present versus absent (Hypothesis 1a), that a peer recognition system (absent 
rewards) leads to a greater increase in in-group versus out-group helping (Hypothesis 2), 
                                                          
19 In the analyses presented hereafter, I include all participants. Results for my main 
hypotheses tests related to group affiliation (i.e., hypotheses 2 and 3) are either 
inferentially identical, or in some noted cases, become slightly more significant if I 
exclude participants who did not correctly respond to this question. 
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and that adding rewards leads to a greater increase in out-group versus in-group helping 
(Hypothesis 3).20  
Time spent helping is measured on a five-point scale from which participants 
could choose to (1) spend no time helping, (i.e., 0 seconds), (2) spend one minute (60 
seconds) helping, (3) spend two minutes (120 seconds) or half their time helping, (4) 
spend three minutes (180 seconds) helping, or (5) spend the full four minutes (240 
seconds) helping. The distribution of the total number of participants making each choice 
is displayed in Figure 4.2, Panel A (and by condition in Figure 4.2, Panel B). 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the data is not normally distributed and a Shapiro-Wilk 
Test confirms this (p < 0.001). As such, tests that require a normality assumption (e.g., 
ANOVA or linear regression) are not optimal. Instead, I test my hypotheses in two 
different ways. My primary interest is in in how my manipulations influence helping to 
be relatively higher or relatively lower and while a median split lacks nuance, it does 
capture this important element. Accordingly, I first test whether the probability that a 
participant gave at least half of their time to help the other participant (which roughly 
approximates a median split) varies in a manner consistent with my predicted pattern. I 
then follow up this analysis and provide addition insights into how my manipulations are 
                                                          
20 As suggested by Figure 4.1, I do not find that helping behavior was higher in the in-
group versus out-group condition when no peer recognition system was present. 
Importantly, this does not prevent me from testing my hypothesized interactions, or 
related theory suggesting that peer recognition systems strengthen in-group team identity. 
While prior research might imply a main effect would also be present, a possible reason it 
did not manifest could be that I used a relatively weak form of group affiliation 
manipulation. For example, my participants never independently communicate, nor do 
they work with their group members, either on their primary task, or on a team building 
task (see Kachelmeier & Van Landuyt, 2017 and King, 2002 for examples of similar but 
potentially stronger manipulations).  
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influencing behavior across the full range of choices (i.e., did they lead participants to 
help versus not help, or influence the amount of help they gave given that they helped). 
 As shown in Figure 4.2, participants did not view all helping choices the same, 
and the majority of participants (55.2%) gave either no help (33.9%) or the minimum 
help (22.4%), while the remaining participants (44.8%) gave half of their time or more. I 
therefore categorize those who gave half of their time or more as “high helpers” and 
those who gave less than this as “low helpers.” The percentage of “high helpers” by 
condition is shown in Figure 4.3. I now proceed to test whether the likelihood of being a 
“high helper” varies as hypothesized, using binary logistic regression. 
Hypotheses tests 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that employee helping behavior will be greater when a 
peer recognition system is present than when it is absent. Table 4.2 presents results 
related to this hypothesis. As shown in Panel B, participants are significantly more likely 
to be a “high helper” when a recognition system is present (including with rewards) 
versus absent (Wald = 3.02; p = 0.041, one-tailed), with the percent of “high helpers” 
when no peer recognition system is present being 35.9% and the percent of “high 
helpers” when a peer recognition system is present being 49.2% (see Table 4.2, Panel A). 
This supports Hypothesis 1a. 
 Hypothesis 1b predicts that employee expectations of receiving help will mediate 
the relation between a peer recognition system and employee helping behavior. To assess 
participants’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of receiving help, I ask them the following 
question (prior to them knowing how much help they actually received): “How likely do 
you think it is that you were helped by someone else during the additional time?” 
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Responses are provided on a seven-point scale with endpoints 1 = Very unlikely, and 7 = 
Very likely.  As shown in Panel A of Table 4.2, results reveal that participants believe the 
likelihood of receiving help is significantly higher when a peer recognition system is 
present (combined average of the peer recognition and peer recognition with rewards 
conditions = 3.35) than when it is absent (average in the no peer recognition conditions = 
2.71) and this difference is statistically significant (t = 3.01; p = 0.002, one-tailed). To 
formally test the mediation effect predicted in Hypothesis 1b, I use PROCESS (Hayes, 
2013) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Figure 4.4 presents the results of the mediation 
model. As shown in Figure 4.4, the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of peer 
recognition systems on the likelihood of being a “high helper” through perceived 
likelihood of being helped is entirely above zero (lower bound = 0.17; upper bound = 
0.83) supporting the mediation effect predicted in Hypothesis 1b.21 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the increase in employee helping behavior caused by a 
peer recognition system (absent rewards) will be greater when helping is in-group as 
opposed to out-group.22 This suggests an interaction between group affiliation and the 
presence/absence of a peer recognition system (while excluding rewards). To test this 
                                                          
21 Note that as shown in Figure 4.4 the direct effect (as denoted by C’), which is the effect 
of peer recognition systems on the likelihood of being a “high helper” while controlling 
for perceived likelihood of being helped is not significant. This suggests that, as discussed 
in the theory section, any effect due to the peer recognition system directly signaling that 
the firm wants helping behavior is not significant when taking into account the indirect 
effect the system has on employees’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of receiving help. 
22 To control for associations participants might have had outside of the laboratory, I 
asked participants to indicate their agreement to the following two questions: “BEFORE 
entering the experiment I knew the person I had the opportunity to help during today’s 
study?” and “How likely do you believe you are to interact in the future with the person 
that you had the opportunity to help?” Interaction results reported here for Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3 are robust to controlling for these two questions. 
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hypothesis, I run a binary logistical regression with “high helper” as the dependent 
variable and group affiliation, peer recognition system (present/absent), and the 
interaction term as independent variables. Results are presented in Table 4.3, Panel A. As 
shown, the interaction term is significant (Wald = 3.74; p = 0.027, one-tailed), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. Follow up analyses in Panel B show that the presence (versus absence) of a 
peer recognition system has a significant positive effect on in-group helping (Wald = 
4.93; p = 0.013, one-tailed), but not on out-group helping (Wald = 0.28; p = 0.599, two-
tailed).  
My theory suggests that absent rewards tied to peer recognition, a peer 
recognition system will have a greater effect on helping behavior among in-group (versus 
out-group) members because it enhances the sense of team identity these individuals feel 
toward one another. Similar to Towry (2003), I measure participants’ sense of team 
identity using the following question: “To what extent do you view the person you had 
the opportunity to help as a teammate?” Responses are provided on a seven-point scale 
with endpoints 1 = “Not at all,” and 7 = “Very much.” Mean responses to this question by 
condition are graphically displayed in Figure 4.5. 
As predicted by my theory, among individuals who share an in-group status, a 
peer recognition system (absent rewards) leads to a significant increase in the sense of 
team identity participants feel (untabulated; t = 1.89; p = 0.032, one-tailed). Further, this 
increase in team identification mediates the relation between a peer recognition system 
(absent rewards) and the likelihood of being a “high helper” among in-group members 
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(untabulated; lower bound = 0.03, upper bound = 0.99).23  Conversely, the presence of a 
peer recognition system does not significantly increase team identification for out-group 
members (untabulated; t = 0.38; p = 0.706, two-tailed). 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be 
more beneficial for out-group helping than in-group helping. This suggests an interaction 
between group affiliation and the presence/absence of rewards within a peer recognition 
system. To test this hypothesis, I run a binary logistical regression with “high helper” as 
the dependent variable and group affiliation, rewards (present/absent), and the interaction 
term as independent variables. Results are presented in Table 4.4, Panel A. As shown, the 
interaction term is significant (Wald = 2.61; p = 0.054, one-tailed), supporting 
Hypothesis 3.24 Follow up analyses in Panel B show that adding rewards to a peer 
recognition system has a positive effect on out-group helping (Wald = 2.30; p = 0.065, 
one-tailed), but not on in-group helping (Wald = 0.58; p = 0.448, two-tailed).  
These findings are consistent with my theory, which suggests that social 
motivation and rewards act as substitutes, and that adding rewards to a peer recognition 
                                                          
23 In addition to measuring participants’ feelings of team identity, I also asked 
participants to indicate their agreement/disagreement to four statements intended to 
assess the degree to which they were concerned about the social approval of the person 
they could help. The four statements were: (1) I thought a lot about what that person 
might think of me. (2) I was concerned about the approval of that person. (3) I thought a 
lot about what that person’s opinion of me would be. (4) I was concerned about that 
person’s impression of me. When I combine these four questions into a single factor 
score I find that it does not mediate the relation between a peer recognition system and 
the likelihood of being a “high helper” regardless of whether participants share an in-
group status or not. This suggests that it is the team identity participants feel and not 
concerns for social approval that are driving the increase in helping behavior when no 
rewards are present and participants share an in-group status.  
24 If participants who failed to correctly identify that the participant they could help 
was/was not in their color group are dropped, this result becomes more significant 
(untabulated; 2 = 3.75; p = 0.027, one-tailed).  
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system is more effective for out-group versus in-group helping because in the out-group 
case there is less substitution of social motivation taking place. Also consistent with this 
theory, I find that, although the presence of a peer recognition (absent rewards) led to a 
significant increase in the sense of team identity in-group members feel (relative to when 
no peer recognition system is present, as reported above), this increase is no longer 
significant when rewards are added to the system (untabulated; t = 1.12; p = 0.266, two-
tailed) (see Figure 4.5). I also find that rewards have no significant effect on the sense of 
team identity felt by out-group members (untabulated; t = 0.09; p = 0.932, two-tailed). 
This is also consistent with my theory that the reward incentive (and not a sense of team 
identity) is driving the increase in helping behavior among out-group participants.  
Alternative test of hypotheses: no help versus some help 
 In this section, I analyze how my manipulations influenced whether a participant 
chose to help versus not help at all, and in the following section, I analyze the amount of 
help chosen, given that a participant chose to help. Using a binary dependent variable 
coded as 1 if a participant chose to help (regardless of the amount) and 0 if they did not 
help at all (i.e., they used the full 4 minutes to work for themselves), I find support for 
Hypothesis 1a (Wald = 2.95; p = 0.043, one-tailed). Further, Hypothesis 1b is also 
supported using this dependent variable (95% confidence interval: lower bound = 0.31; 
upper bound = 1.48). This suggests that the presence (versus absence) of a peer 
recognition system led participants to be more likely to help and that their perceived 
likelihood of being helped explains this effect. 
I next test whether Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are supported using this 
dependent variable, but find that they are not (Hypothesis 2, p = 0.405 and Hypothesis 3, 
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p = 0.491). As such, I cannot assert that the probability of helping some versus not at all 
is influenced by my varables in the interactive ways that I hypothesized. 
Alternative test of hypotheses: Amount of help, given a participant chose to help 
 In this section I test whether the amount of help participants chose to provide, 
given that they chose to help (i.e., time helping > 0), varies in a manner consistent with 
my predictions using ordinal logistic regression. I first test whether participants provide 
more help when a peer recognition system is present versus absent (Hypothesis 1a), but 
do not find support that they do (Wald = 1.02; p = 0.157, one-tailed). Similarly, 
Hypothesis 1b is not supported. Given this combined with my prior analysis, it appears 
that the general presence versus absence of a peer recognition system primarily 
influences whether help is given (versus not), but not how much help is given.  
I next test Hypothesis 2 that a peer recognition system will have a greater positive 
effect on in-group versus out-group helping and find marginal support for the predicted 
interaction (Wald = 1.78; p = 0.091, one-tailed). I also test Hypothesis 3 that adding 
rewards to a peer recognition system will have a greater positive effect on out-group 
helping than in-group helping and again find marginal support for the predicted 
interaction (Wald = 2.34; p = 0.063, one-tailed). 
 While the analysis presented in the prior paragraph does provide marginal support 
for my predicted interactions, the results do not fully match those reported earlier using 
the median split. As such, I conduct additional analysis to provide further insights. 
Specifically, it is possible that certain types of individuals may choose to always help, 
regardless of whether or not (or what type of) a peer recognition system is in place. If this 
is the case, these individuals may be clouding my ability to detect my predicted effects 
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among those participants who are receptive to peer recognition systems. As shown in 
Table 4.1, the percent of participants who helped the maximum of 240 seconds (i.e., gave 
all their time to help) ranges from 6.3% - 21.9%. A chi-square test however, does not find 
that the probability of helping the maximum varies across my six experimental conditions 
(untabulated; 2 = 4.85; p = 0.434, two-tailed). This suggests that the proportion of 
participants at the maximum of the helping range does not significantly vary based on the 
presence (or type) of peer recognition system (or group affiliation for that matter).25  
Given this, I proceed to test whether the interactions predicted in Hypotheses 2 
and 3 manifest among participants in the middle of the range (i.e., who did not chose to 
help for 0 or 240 seconds). I first test Hypothesis 2, which predicts that peer recognition 
systems (absent rewards) will be more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group 
helping. Results from the ordinal logistic regression reveal a highly significant interaction 
(untabulated; Wald = 7.40; p = 0.004, one-tailed). Hypothesis 3 predicts that adding 
rewards to a peer recognition system will be more beneficial for out-group versus in-
group helping. Results from the ordinal logistic regression again reveal a highly 
significant interaction (untabulated; Wald = 8.33; p = 0.002, one-tailed).26 
                                                          
25 This result is akin to findings reported in the honesty literature (e.g., Evans et al., 2001) 
which find that some individuals always prefer to be honest regardless of their condition. 
I also find some evidence that these individuals are unique demographically. Specifically, 
there were less non-native English speakers who helped the maximum relative to those 
who chose other (non-zero) helping choices (2 = 3.07; p = 0.080, two-tailed). 
Accordingly, it is possible that cultural differences were associated with the helping 
choices of these individuals.      
26 Results reported in this paragraph for Hypotheses 2 and 3 are inferentially identical if I 
use linear regression instead of ordinal logistic regression. 
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Discussion of results 
While my analyses suggest that my results are subject to limitations, I also believe 
that I have provided relevant findings that support my theory. I first presented evidence 
that my theory is effective in predicting the likelihood that a participant will be a 
relatively “high helper.” I defined “high helpers” as those who gave at least half of their 
time to help the other participant. I believe that this analysis provides relevant and 
generalizable inferences, as it captures whether participants helped relatively more or 
relatively less. I then conducted alternative tests in which I analyzed participants’ choices 
to help versus not, and the amount of help given, assuming that they did help. These 
analyses revealed three additional takeaways. First, they suggest that the presence (versus 
absence) of a peer recognition system appears to be a primary driver in leading more 
individuals to help (versus not). Second, they suggest that certain types of individuals 
may not respond to peer recognition systems. This may be informative for firms 
contemplating implementing a peer recognition system. For example, if the firm believes 
that a large number of their employees fall into this category, a peer recognition system 
may be less effective for them. And third, importantly, I do find that my theory is 
predictive of behavior among individuals in the middle of the helping range. Thus, 
although my theory may not apply to every employee, it does appear to apply to a 
significant group of employees. Taken together, I believe I provide compelling findings 






Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Count of participants making each time spent helping choice, as well as mean time (standard deviations) for each condition 








































































































Table 4.1 (Cont.) 
 
Notes to Table 4.1: 
- Time spent helping is measured as the amount of time (in seconds) that participants chose to spend helping the other participant. 
Participants could choose to spend 0 seconds, 60 seconds, 120 seconds, 180 seconds, or 240 seconds. 
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or an opportunity to be recognized by a peer. 
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they could be 
recognized and thanked if they choose to help. 
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer recognition 
condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options were the 
following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, M&M’s, and Twix candy bar. 
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color group than the helping participant. 
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as the helping participant.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and tests for Hypothesis 1a 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics: percent of “high helpers” by condition and mean 
(standard deviation) perceived likelihood of receiving help by condition 
  
No peer recognition 
conditions 
 
All peer recognition 
present conditions 
Percent “high helpers” 35.9% 
n = 64 
 
49.2% 
n = 128 




n = 64 
3.35 
(1.44) 
n = 128 
 
Panel B: Effect of a peer recognition system on likelihood of being a “high helper” and 
perceived likelihood of receiving help 
  Test statistic p-value 
“High helpers” 
No peer recognition system  
vs  










Perceived likelihood of receiving help 
No peer recognition system  
vs  
All peer recognition present conditions 








* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect. 
 
Notes to Table 4.2: 
-High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or less 
helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.  
-Perceived likelihood of receiving help: represents the average response to the following 
question: “How likely do you think it is that you were helped by someone else during the 
additional time?” (responses were on a seven point scale anchored at 1 = “Very unlikely,” 
and 7 = “Very likely”). 
-In the no peer recognition conditions, there is no mention of a peer recognition system 
or an opportunity to be recognized by a peer. 
-All peer recognition present conditions consist of the peer recognition conditions and the 
peer recognition with rewards conditions. In the peer recognition conditions, participants 
are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they could be 
recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the peer recognition with rewards 
conditions, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer 
recognition condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small 
reward if they are recognized. 
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Table 4.3 Tests for Hypothesis 2 
Panel A: Test for Hypothesis 2, interaction between group affiliation and the 
presence/absence of a peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a “high helper”  
Binary Logistic Regression Output Wald 2 df p-value 
Group affiliation  2.46 1 0.117 
Peer recognition present/absent  1.41 1 0.236 
Group affiliation * Peer recognition 3.74 1   0.027* 
* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect. 
 
Panel B: Follow up analyses for Hypothesis 2, effect of a peer recognition system on in-
group and out-group likelihood of being a “high helper”  
 Wald 2 p-value 
Presence versus absence of peer 













* Presented p-value is one-tailed 
Notes to Table 4.3: 
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or 
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping. 
-Group affiliation is a binary variable that equals 1 if in-group and 0 if out-group. In the 
in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as 
the helping participant. In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is 
from a different color group than the helping participant. 
-Peer recognition present/absent is a binary variable that equal 1 for the peer recognition 
condition and 0 for the no peer recognition condition. In the peer recognition condition, 
participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they 
could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the no peer recognition 
condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or an opportunity to be 







Table 4.4 Tests for Hypothesis 3 
Panel A: Test for Hypothesis 3, interaction between group affiliation and the 
presence/absence of rewards on the likelihood of being a “high helper”   
Binary Logistic Regression Output Wald 2 df p-value 
Group affiliation  3.83 1 0.050 
Rewards present/absent  0.31 1 0.580 
Group affiliation * Rewards 2.61 1   0.054* 
* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect. 
 
Panel B: Follow up analyses for Hypothesis 3, effect of rewards on in-group and out-
group likelihood of being a “high helper”  
 Wald 2 p-value 
Presence versus absence of rewards 











  0.065* 
  
* Presented p-value is one-tailed 
Notes to Table 4.1: 
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or 
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping. 
-Group affiliation is a binary variable that equals 1 if in-group and 0 if out-group. In the 
in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as 
the helping participant. In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is 
from a different color group than the helping participant. 
- Rewards present/absent is a binary variable that equals 1 if peer recognition with 
rewards condition and 0 if peer recognition condition. In the peer recognition condition, 
participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they 
could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the peer recognition with 
rewards condition, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer 
recognition condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small 
reward if they are recognized. The reward options were the following: stress ball, pencil 










Figure 4.1 Pattern of means for helping behavior by condition 
 
Notes to Figure 4.1: 
-Time spent helping is measured as the amount of time (in seconds) that participants 
chose to spend helping the other participant. Participants could choose to spend between 
zero and four minutes helping, in one minute increments.  
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or 
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer. 
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer 
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose 
to help. 
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same 
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that 
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options 
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, 
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar. 
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color 
group than the helping participant. 
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color 
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of participants who were “high helpers” by condition 
 
Notes to Figure 4.3: 
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or 
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping. 
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or 
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer. 
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer 
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose 
to help. 
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same 
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that 
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options 
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, 
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar. 
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color 
group than the helping participant. 
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color 



























































Confidence interval for the indirect effect of a peer recognition system on time helping 
through perceived likelihood of being helped: 














* Presented confidence interval is based on a 95% confidence level. 
 
Figure 4.4 Test of Hypothesis 1b: Mediation analysis 
 
Notes to figure 4.4: 
-Bolded tests are one-tailed.  
-Peer recognition present (includes both the peer recognition and peer recognition with 
rewards conditions): Participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system 
present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help. 
-Perceived likelihood of receiving help: represents the average response to the 
following question: “How likely do you think it is that you were helped by someone 
else during the additional time?” (responses were on a seven point scale anchored at 1 
= “Very unlikely,” and 7 = “Very likely”). 
-High helper: is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or 
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping. 
-Process uses binary logistic regression when assessing links with a binary dependent 
variable. 
-C represents the total effect of a Peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a 
“high helper” without considering the effect of the mediating variable. C’ represents 
the direct effect of a Peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a “high helper” 








system (present vs. 
absent) 
A = 0.64 
(p = 0.001) 
B = 0.70 
(p < 0.001) 
C’ = 0.19 
(p = 0.592) 
C = 0.55 







Figure 4.5 Plot of means for the sense of team identity participants feel in relation to the 
person they could help by condition 
 
Notes to Figure 4.5: 
-Team identity is measured by participant’s responses to the following question: “To what 
extent do you view the person you had the opportunity to help as a teammate?” 
Responses are given on a seven point scale with endpoints 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very 
much.” 
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or 
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer. 
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer 
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose 
to help. 
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same 
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that 
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options 
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, 
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar. 
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color 
group than the helping participant. 
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color 




























This study finds that group affiliation is an important factor to consider when 
designing peer recognition systems and provides insights for managers regarding when 
tying rewards to peer recognition is likely to be most beneficial. In so doing, this study 
provides valuable insights for managerial accountants who have responsibility over 
incentive, control, and performance management systems (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; 
IMA, 2019). This study suggests that firms should consider the nature of the social 
environment and group affiliations of their employees when deciding what type of peer 
recognition system to implement. For example, if a firm wishes to encourage greater 
helping behavior across groups, tying rewards to the peer recognition may be particularly 
useful for them. Alternatively, if a firm is able to strengthen the degree to which 
employees view themselves as being part of the same group, my results suggest that tying 
rewards to peer recognition provides little incremental benefit. 
This study also adds to the motivation literature by considering the effects of peer 
recognition systems. Research has recently begun to examine the effects of recognition 
from superiors on employee effort to complete their own work (Bradler et al., 2014; 
Burke, 2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017), but has not yet considered the effects of 
recognition from peers on helping behaviors. This paper provides an initial exploration 





affiliation and the addition of rewards are important factors to consider in understanding 
the effects of peer recognition systems.  
This study is subject to limitations that offer possibilities for future research. 
While the business press tends to suggest that most firms are using too little, rather than 
too much recognition (e.g., Gallup, 2016; Motivosity, 2016; Nelson, 2012), it is possible 
that excessive amounts of recognition (including from peers) could cheapen the perceived 
value of being recognized and lead these systems to become ineffective. Further, the 
design of my study would seem to best speak to settings in which informal peer 
recognition is mostly absent, or generally ineffective. If companies already have highly 
effective informal recognition cultures in place, then the effect of adding a formal peer 
recognition system could be less (or more) positive than what is documented here. Future 
research may wish to consider these possibilities. In my experiment, I control for 
reputation and strategic effects by limiting interactions to a single period. This design 
choice allows me to cleanly test my theoretical explanations; however, future research 
might consider the effects of peer recognition in a multi-period setting. Considering 
multiple periods could clarify how being recognized (or not) influences helping behavior 
in future periods.  
In my study, I assume that the firm wants helping behavior, and that within the 
possible range, more helping is better; however there likely exist settings where this is 
not the case. Future research could consider whether peer recognition systems might lead 
to excessive amounts of helping (e.g., at the expense of employees’ own work) and 
whether different modifications to those systems might encourage more optimal amounts 





benefits from implementing peer recognition programs (e.g., better individual 
performance, employee satisfaction, reduced turnover, etc.). The effect of peer 
recognition systems on other dependent variables could be an interesting area for future 
research. In addition, future research might consider the effect of varying the frequency 
of peer recognition or the degree of personalization of recognition messages. Future 
research might also consider costs and benefits of varying the value of rewards associated 
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EXCERPT FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT
The experimenter read the following instructions, while participants followed along on 
computer monitors. 
Your task today is to input hypothetical customer numbers into the computer. An 
example is shown below: 
 
Name Customer Number 
Bob Martino 652331 
Sam Smith 624409 
Lydia Wright 851612 
Melinda Crapo 622243 
Hank Nelson 319882 
  
Name: Sam Smith 
Customer Number: 
   
  
If you were given this example you would need to type by hand (you will not be able to 
copy and paste) “624409” into the customer number box for Sam Smith which is shown 
above. There will be many such entries to complete and you can access more entries by 
scrolling down the page. Once you input the number you can proceed to the next entry—
you do not have to press enter.  
 
While completing the actual task all participants saw the same customer listings in the 
same order. Only entries that were input correctly were counted, however as discussed in 
the body of the paper, my primary dependent variable is the amount of time participants 
spent helping (not the number of entries they completed).  
 
